Wednesday, February 7, 2018

Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) incorporation into the National Aerospace System: Sense-and avoid challenges.


One of the major topics in unmanned vehicles operations is the lack of effective sense-and-avoid (SAA) capabilities of the UAS (Oliver, 2016). A key challenge within the SAA problem is to reliably and automatically detect potential midair aircraft collisions (Bratanov, Mejias, & Ford, 2017).  The ability of the UAS to sense and avoid surrounding traffic must be fully addressed before the UAS can be integrated into the National Aerospace System. As we know, most manned aircraft carry advanced traffic collision avoidance technologies (Federal Aviation Administration [FAA], n.d.). However, UAS are not currently required to incorporate any sense-and-avoid equipment. Piloted aircraft are required to maintain a visual scan for traffic at all times. However, UAS may be difficult to detect due to their small size. Detection is even more difficult in poor meteorological conditions. Since there is no pilot directly at the controls of the UAS, visual traffic detection may be inadequate due to the limited field of view, control signal latency, and other technological constraints. During manned aircraft operations, the pilots are directly responsible to visually detect, avoid, and maintain a safe distance from the surrounding traffic (Consiglio, Chamberlain, Munos, & Hoffler, 2012). Manned aircraft employ a variety of methods for traffic separation. Pilots rely on visual cues, air traffic control (ATC) advisories, and other sensory information available in the cockpit.

The FAA has restricted UAS operations below 400 feet above ground level (AGL), and within the line of sight of the pilot, and in fair meteorological conditions (FAA, 2016). These limitations may help in separating UAS from piloted aircraft to some degree. Nevertheless, these restrictions do not provide the acceptable level of safety. Eventually, UAS missions will have to be extended to altitudes beyond 400 feet AGL and UAS will be operating alongside piloted aircraft in all airspace segments.

The lack of UAS SAA capability and its adverse effects on aviation safety has been a subject of research. The first SAA alternative offered by scholars is a ground-based SAA (GBSAA). This method employs the UAS pilot housed in the ground control station (GCS) as the primary authority for detection, evaluation, and execution of the traffic avoidance maneuvers. The traffic information would be displayed on the screen in the GCS. The UAS pilot will also rely on ATC traffic advisories and alerts and, if necessary, follow the ATC recommendations to avoid the surrounding traffic.

The second alternative action for SAA problem mitigation is to incorporate traffic detecting and avoidance technology directly onboard of the UAS. There are a variety of SAA sensor options available. SAA sensors can be grouped into two categories: cooperative and non-cooperative technologies (Albaker & Rahim, 2011). Cooperative sensors require the installation of transponder equipment on board the aircraft to broadcast its position information and interrogate surrounding traffic (Asmat et al., n.d.). Cooperative sensors will only function if all participating aircraft are equipped with transponders (Fasano, Accardo, Tirri, Moccia, & DeLellis, 2015). On the other hand, non-cooperative sensors are capable to detect airborne targets autonomously, regardless of whether the intruder aircraft carry any SAA equipment or regardless of transponder installation (Asmat et al., n.d.).

A couple examples of cooperative technologies are the Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) and the Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS). ADS-B and is a part of the NexGen ATC system (Zimmerman, 2013).


Figure 1. ADS-B diagram. ADS-B includes ground stations, GPS, and aircraft avionics. Adapted from “ADS-B 101: What is it and why you should care,” by J. Zimmerman, 2013. Copyright 2013 by J. Zimmerman.



Figure 2. TCAS Version 7.1 with smart reversion logic allows pilot to properly select the corrective maneuver, avoid overcorrection, and reverses resolution advisories in accordance with intruder aircraft maneuvering. Adapted from “TCAS II Version 7.1,.” by Eurocontrol, 2014. Copyright 2014 by Eurocontrol.

Another option is to use non-cooperative sensors for UAS SAA. Many researchers have focused more on non-cooperative sensors of the active and passive type as they can provide better detection of the non-cooperative traffic (McClellan, Kang, & Woosely, 2017). There are a variety of technologies currently available, each with its specific advantages and drawbacks (Yu & Zhang, 2015). The main advantage of non-cooperative sensors is their ability to detect the intruder regardless of what equipment is installed on the other aircraft. Therefore, non-cooperative technology is useful if other traffic does not have a transponder or the ADS-B equipment. This sensor category includes the following: thermal, electro-optic/infrared (EO/IR), acoustic, laser obstacle avoidance system (LOAM), millimeter wave radar (MMW), and synthetic aperture radar (SAR).

Sensor fusion is another approach, which combines cooperative and non-cooperative technologies to compensate for limitations of the sensing systems. The research and development in sensors fusion are however still in its initial stages. Using both cooperative and non-cooperative airborne sensor in combination with ground-based traffic surveillance will increase the UAS SAA capability and, therefore, raise the levels of operational safety. Researchers have need testing and suggesting various sensor combinations in different SAA scenarios and evaluating the capabilities of various technology.

Another technological challenge in SAA is to meet the size, weight, and power (SWaP) limitations of UAS and especially small-UAS while still maintaining the needed sensing capability. Some researchers propose the use of miniaturized airborne radar for automated traffic detection and avoidance (Roberts, 2017).

SAA capability should become a major prerequisite for UAS operations in the NAS. SAA capability should be considered a minimum performance requirement for unmanned aircraft. It is important to test the SAA algorithms for different flight scenarios. For example, different aircraft convergence situation should be tested, such as head-on approach, climbing from below, or descending from above. It would be advantageous to perform SAA testing in the various weather conditions. For instance, daylight visual flight rules (VFR) and night VFR. Simulation and actual flight testing should be conducted with different UAS groups to determine that the SAA system meets the required levels of safety (Kuchar, n.d.).

UAS SAA is an overwhelming problem being discussed among aviation regulatory and safety agencies. UAS proliferation is rapidly increasing in the civilian sector, and it is imperative to address a means to incorporate SSA for safe UAS operation. Standardized equipment mandates, UAS certification, and pilot training for SAA scenarios should be established and enforced. Proper standards should be set to assure that UAS collision avoidance performance equals to that of the manned aircraft collision avoidance capabilities. The FAA should revise some of the regulatory documentation to include proper amendments for UAS operations. 

UAS integration into the NAS should not compromise safety or efficiency of the airspace operations. UAS will have to adapt to the standards and procedure currently employed in the NAS. However, it is probable that the current rules and regulations for manned aircraft will have to be adjusted to include the new UAS members. Only then we will be able to take a full advantage of the benefits UAS offer. 



References
Albaker, B. M., & Rahim, N. A. (2011). A conceptual framework and a review of conflict sensing, detection, awareness and escape maneuvering methods for UAVs. Retrieved from UMPEDAC Research Centre, Faculty of Engineering, University of Malaya: http://www.intechopen.com/books/aeronautics-and-astronautics/a-conceptual-framework-and-a-review-of-conflict-sensing-detection-awareness-and-escape-maneuvering-m

Asmat, J., Rhodes, B., Umansky, J., Villlavicencio, C., Yunas, A., Donohue, G., & Lacher, A. (n.d.). UAS safety: unmanned aerial collision avoidance system. Retrieved from http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/articleDetails.jsp?arnumber=4055110

Bratanov, D., Mejias, L., & Ford, J. (2017). A vision-based sense-and-avoid system tested on a ScanEagle UAV. International Conference on UAS. https://doi.org/10.1109/ICUAS.2017.7991302
Eurocontrol. (2014). TCAS II Version 7.1. Retrieved from http://www.eurocontrol.int/articles/tcas-ii-version-71

Federal Aviation Administration. (2016). Summary of small unmanned aircraft rule (part 107). Retrieved from http://www.faa.gov/uas/media/Part_107_Summary.pdf

Federal Aviation Administration. (n.d.). 14 CFR 91.227 - Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) Out equipment performance requirements. Retrieved from https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/14/91.227

Kuchar, J. K. (n.d.). Safety analysis methodology for unmanned aerial vehicle (UAVs) collision avoidance systems. Retrieved from Massachusetts Institute of Technology: http://www.ll.mit.edu/mission/aviation/publications/publication-files/ms-papers/Kuchar_2005_ATM_MS-19102_WW-18698.pdf









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